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Abstract 
  
 Most countries which have experienced exchange rate crises over the last two decades have 
been under soft pegs or crawls. These exchange rate arrangements have normally succumbed in the 
face of massive capital inflow reversals --especially in developing countries-- thus provoking a 
search for options. Hard pegs and floating regimes seem to be the only viable options. 
This paper carries through an empirical analysis with panel data to study the relationship 
between the option of exchange rate regime and macroeconomic performance in developing 
countries. We use an extended and updated database to study the evidence for 154 countries over 
the period 1974-2004. Performance is measured by per capita GDP growth and its volatility. Our 
results show that floating rates tend to present higher levels of growth and lower levels of volatility 
in relation to other exchange rate arrangements. Intermediate regimes (soft and crawling pegs), on 
the other hand, score at the bottom of the growth rankings, while hard pegs appear to induce the 
largest growth volatility. 
 In light of these results, it should not come as a surprise that the world is not moving to a 
single global currency, as some have predicted. The world is moving to fewer currencies, but at an 
extremely slow pace. Yet, floating rates will probably remain the most popular form of exchange 
rate regime over the next half century. This paper provides some basis for that popularity.     
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1. Introduction 
 
Until recently, little importance was given to the exchange rate regime as a determinant of 
macroeconomic performance. This situation has changed following the Asian crises of 1997-98 and 
its repercussions in Russia and Latin America. Almost all the countries that fell into crises had 
managed pegs (i.e., Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea; then Russia, Brazil and Ecuador). The 
pressure caused by massive capital inflow reversal and weakened domestic financial markets caused 
the collapse of exchange rate regimes, even in those countries following sound macroeconomic 
policies. 
The failure of soft pegs has provoked a search for options, especially in developing 
countries where hard pegs and flexible regimes appear as the only options. However, economic 
theory does not provide clear results in order to assess and use this emerging consensus as a useful 
framework for economic policy. Hence, the problem is in the end empirical in nature. 
This paper carries through an empirical analysis to study the relationship between the 
exchange rate regime and macroeconomic performance in developing countries. Performance is 
measured by two variables: per capita GDP growth and the volatility of per capita GDP growth. Our 
analysis uses a de-facto classification and not the IMF de-jure classification utilized by most papers 
in this area.  We use an extended sample of countries up to the year 2004, thus considering the 
numerous collapses and regime changes occurred in the second half of the 1990s.  The results 
showed in this paper give empirical support to the preference for flexible regimes raised, among 
others, by Larraín and Velasco (2001, 2002).    
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the recent evolution of exchange rate 
regimes through the world, including dollarization and currency boards; then, section 3 reviews the 
main theorical arguments for the election of an exchange rate regime. The next section discusses the 
specific empirical literature linked to our paper; section 5 describes the data and our empirical 
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approach;  section 6 shows a preliminary empirical analysis, whereas section 7 shows and analyzes 
our results. Finally, section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Recent evolution of exchange rates regimes 
 
Figures 1 and 2 describe the evolution of exchange rate regimes based on the classification of the 
International Monetary Fund (2002, 2004) for the period 1990-2004.  Figure 1 plots the whole 
sample of countries, and clearly shows that the proportion of countries with intermediate regimes 
has diminished through time while extreme arrangements have become more popular.  However, 
the exchange rate option has not been indifferent between the extremes: floats have gained more 
ground than hard pegs. 
This trend is even more evident for developing countries, as shown in Figure 2. 
Intermediate exchange rate regimes have diminished from 68.4% of the total countries considered 
in 1990 to 31.7% in 2004, whereas flexible arrangements have increased from 13.2% in 1990 to 
46.3% in 2004. Hard pegs  have experienced a much slower increase, going from 18.4% in 1990 to 
22.0% in 2004. The difference between the total sample and developing countries with respect to 
hard pegs is explained by the adoption of the Euro in 11 developed countries  in 1999. 
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Figure 1. Exchange Rate Regimes, 1990-2004 
All Countries 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Source: IMF (2002, 2004). 
Figure 2. Exchange Rate Regimes, 1990-2004 
 Developing Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF (2002, 2004) 
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 Among hard pegs, the most radical alternative is to adopt the currency of another country as 
legal tender. The most common case is dollarization --when the U.S. dollar is used. This is the only 
type of hard peg arrangement existing in Latin America since the Argentinean currency board died 
in December 2001. Table 1 describes some officially dollarized countries by the end of 2004.  
Iinterestingly, the only dollarized economies of certain size are in Latin America. Outside this 
region the dollarized countries are very small: none with more than 130,000 inhabitants. Another 
interesting aspect is that Latin America has both the oldest dollarization --Panama--, which has 
lasted a century using the U.S. dollar as legal tender, and the most recent ones --Ecuador (2000) and 
El Salvador (2001). It is worth noticing that Ecuador dollarized when the country was experiencing  
an economic and political crisis, which finally caused the collapse of the government.  
Dollarization can be an attractive choice for small countries, with flexible prices, bad 
experience in the use of the monetary policy, high levels of trade of goods and capital flows with 
the U. S., and highly correlated shocks with those affecting the U. S. These countries can reduce 
inflation to levels similar to those of the country whose currency they adopt, benefit from lower 
interest rates and a lower exchange rate risk. However, these potential benefits are achieved at the 
cost of a loss of both seigniorage revenue and the ability to use monetary policy as an instrument to 
offset the impact of aggregate shocks. Additionally, the ability of the central bank to act as lender of 
last resort in the face of system-wide liquidity crunches is severely reduced. 
 
Table 1. Dollarized Countries, 2004
2
 
 
 
 
 
Population GDP GDP per capita PPP Trade with USA
(Mill.) ( US$ mill.) (US$) (%)
America
Ecuador 2000 13.213 30281 3885 29.7
El Salvador 2001 6.658 15824 5166 30.9
Panama 1904 3.028 13793 7344 38.5
Outside America
Marshall Islands 1944 0.060 108 1600 n/a
Micronesia 1944 0.127 226 2000 n/a
Palau 1944 0.020 127 9000 n/a
Source : World Bank (2005).
Country Beginning
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Other type of hard peg, less rigid than dollarization, is the currency board.  In this kind of 
arrangement the monetary authority fixes its exchange rate by means of an institutional 
commitment, and changes its money base in strict relation to the change in foreign exchange 
reserves. Nowadays no country in Latin America has a currency board (after the collapse of 
Argentina´s board in December 2001) although it exists in other latitudes, as Table 2 shows. 
 
Table 2. Countries with Currency Board, 2004
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In spite of some influential predictions and powerful advocates, the world does not appear 
to be moving to a single global currency. In a well-known piece, Cooper (1984) endorsed the idea 
and predicted that it would happen by 2009. More recently, other authors have argued in favor of 
just a few currencies for the world;4 probably the most influential advocate of this view is Robert 
Mundell. Nonetheless, though the number of independent currencies has declined over the last 3 
decades, the pace has been extremely slow. In 1974 we counted 169 independent currencies among 
the countries covered by the International Monetary Fund; in 2004 the number was down to 149, 
mainly influenced by the adoptions of the Euro by 12 European countries, and of the Eastern 
Caribbean Currency Unit (ECCU) by a group of 6 Caribbean countries. Thus, the world is moving 
                                                                                                                                                     
2 This selection of countries includes only those that adopted the U.S. dollar as legal tender. 
3 Djibouti was excluded  because of data availability. 
4 Haussman (1999), suggestively titled his paper “Should there be five currencies or one hundred and five?”; 
in the same issue, Larrain and Sachs (1999) argued the case for flating. 
Population GDP GDP per capita PPP
(Mill.) (US$ mill.) (US$)
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997 3.836 8121 7100
Brunei Darussalam 1967 0.361 4800 24826
Bulgaria 1997 7.780 24131 8007
Estonia 1992 1.345 10808 13801
Hong-Kong 1983 6.845 163005 30779
Lithuania 1994 3.439 22263 13021
Source : World Bank (2005).
BeginningCountry
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to fewer currencies, but at an extremely slow pace. Cooper´s prediction will not happen in 2009 or 
anytime in the foreseeable future. More countries are likely to adopt the Euro over the next decade, 
and a few others may dollarize. Yet, we see no reason for the popularity of floating rates to wane. 
On the contrary, floating rates will probably remain the most popular form of exchange rate regime. 
This paper provides some basis for that popularity.     
 
3. Theoretical arguments in the election of exchange rate regime 
 
The theoretical literature usually stresses a trade-off between credibility and flexibility in the 
exchange rate option. The best known statement favoring floating rates is based on Friedman (1953) 
and relates to the ability of a flexible exchange rate to absorb real shocks faced by the economy. 
Friedman argued that in the presence of short-term rigidities (for instance, as a result of non-flexible 
labor markets), real exchange rate adjustments necessarily follow movements in nominal exchange 
rates and, thus, a flexible regime could be better. 
 Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the adjustment towards a new equilibrium takes the 
time domestic prices use in adjusting; this process may be slow and painful when rigidities exits in 
the markets, especially when it is required that prices fall. The consequences of this are reflected in 
price distortions, inefficient allocation of resources, high and persistent unemployment, lower 
growth and higher growth volatility. On the other hand, a flexible exchange rate regime allows 
faster adjustments in the real exchange rate, avoiding the above mentioned problems. Therefore, the 
flexibility argument is especially strong if the country in question is frequently buffeted by large 
and volatile real shocks from abroad. Foreign real variability, moreover, is likely to be large for 
exporters of primary products and for countries that have a large foreign debt, a profile that fits 
many developing countries. Indeed, the 1990s and early 2000s have so far produced large 
fluctuations in the terms of trade and international interest rates relevant for such countries. 
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The main argument favoring hard pegs (in terms of better macroeconomic outcomes) claims 
that local monetary authorities experience higher levels of credibility, given their resignation to 
manage local monetary policy under a world with high capital mobility. Thus, the economy would 
avoid opportunistic and political-cycle maneuvers in monetary policy. However, this argument is 
not always valid, since escape clauses exist and are known to the public. Economies with high 
rigidities or experiencing severe adverse shocks may leave a hard peg in order to recover 
macroeconomic equilibrium faster. Hence, discipline of the monetary authorities under a hard peg is 
not entirely credible; this credibility depends on the trade-off between short-term costs of 
maintaining the regime and defending the currency versus the long-term benefits of the system.  
Public skepticism on the sustainability of a hard peg is frequently reflected in high spreads 
between local currency denominated bonds and foreign currency denominated ones. That was the 
case in Argentina; although managing a currency board - ARG$1 equaling US$1- experienced high 
interest rate spreads between bonds denominated in Argentinean pesos and bonds in US dollars. 
This reflected the market expectations on a probable devaluation of the local currency jointly with 
the low credibility of the system. Even if the system may have been totally credible, there still exists 
default risks under hard pegs, which are also incorporated in bonds spreads. Additionally, as 
pointed by Obstfeld (1997), this kind of situations often allows multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling 
crises.   
A second argument linking better economic outcomes with fixed exchange rate regimes 
relates to better fiscal discipline in countries managing hard pegs. Countries with fixed regimes 
must be especially cautious with their fiscal balances, since (over) expansionary spending can easily 
lead to a balance of payment crisis, as indicated by Krugman (1979). Knowing this fact, 
governments using hard pegs would be extremely cautious with their overall fiscal balances. 
However, as indicated by Tornell and Velasco (2000) flexible exchange rate regimes also face these 
kind of problems; excessive public spending always has negative outcomes. The difference between 
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the two exchange rate arrangements is the intertemporal distribution of costs. Under a fixed regime 
the costs are delayed until international reserves star to deplete; under a float the costs manifest 
themselves immediately through nominal exchange rate depreciation and inflation.  
On the whole, the link between exchange rate regimes and welfare depends on the 
characteristics of the country in question, which determine if credibility or flexibility becomes more 
necessary. Some important factors to consider are the degree of labor market flexibility, openness of 
the economy and capital mobility, correlation of shocks, currency mismatch between assets and 
liabilities, financial development, credibility of policymakers and concentration of output, exports 
and portfolios.  
 
4. Empirical literature  
 
Empirical papers studying the relationship between exchange rate regime choice and 
macroeconomic performance are rather scarce in the literature, though they have increased in recent 
years. Ghosh et. al. (1997) analyze the link between exchange regime options and macroeconomic 
performance studying data for 140 countries in a 30 year sample; their results suggest that growth 
varies only slightly across regimes. 
Hausmann et. al. (1999) state that flexible exchange regimes in Latin America have not 
been related to higher levels of monetary autonomy nor have they successfully worked as a “buffer” 
of external shocks. On the contrary, they argue that free floats have promoted wage indexation and 
pro-cyclical monetary policy responses. They conclude that hard pegs can solve credibility issues 
that are common in Latin American Experience.  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) study 154 countries between the years 1974 and 
2000. Using a de facto classification, they find that more flexibility is strongly linked to higher 
growth rates and lower volatility of output for non-industrial countries. This link appears to be 
  9
much weaker for industrial economies. However, they do not find significant statistical differences 
in macroeconomic outcomes between intermediate and fixed regimes for non-industrial countries.  
On the other hand, Calvo and Mishkin (2003) conclude that the choice of exchange rate  
regime is likely to be of second order importance in the macroeconomic success of emerging 
economies. Their analysis suggests that less attention should be focused on the general question of 
whether a floating or a fixed exchange rate is preferable, and more on institutional reforms, which 
may encourage emerging market countries to be healthier and less prone to the crises that we have 
seen in recent years. 
Edwards and Levi-Yeyati (2003) analyze empirically the effect of terms of trade shocks on 
economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes. Their results suggest that terms of 
trade shocks get amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate regimes. They also find 
evidence supporting the view that, after controlling for other factors, countries with more flexible 
exchange rate regimes tend to grow faster than countries with fixed exchange rates.  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) use monthly data for a sample of 153 countries and classify the 
different exchange systems taking in consideration the parallel market exchange rates. Their 
evidence suggests that exchange rate arrangements may be quite important for growth, trade and 
inflation.  
Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2004) find that countries appear to benefit by having 
increasingly flexible exchange rate systems as they become richer and more financially developed. 
According to their results, pegs are notable for their durability and relatively low inflation in 
developing countries with little exposure to international capital markets. For emerging markets, 
their results show that the exchange regime does not appear to have a systematic effect on growth. 
More recently, Larraín (2005) analyzes the experience of 147 countries between the years 
1974 and 2000. He concludes that countries with flexible regimes are linked with higher levels of 
growth and lower levels of volatility in relation to other possible exchange rate arrangements.  
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The brief literature review in this section and the previous one indicates that  as a result of 
the trade-off between flexibility and credibility, theoretical developments cannot provide us with 
answers on  which exchange regime option is more strongly related to better macroeconomic 
outcomes. Additionally, the empirical evidence is not conclusive and most of the previous studies 
work with data until the year 2000. Nevertheless, we could venture to suggest that the most recent 
works that use a de-facto classification tend to corroborate the superiority of floating regimes over 
hard pegs and intermediate regimes.  We now present some additional evidence on this debate using 
an extended sample of countries up to the year 2004.  
 
5. Data description and methodology 
 
This paper uses panel data from 154 developing countries in a thirty-year sample ranging from 1974 
to 2004.5 Data was collected from the World Bank’s Global Development Indicators6.  
Most cross-country studies on exchange rate regimes use the official de jure regime 
classification reported annually by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such classification has 
the problem that countries frequently do not manage their currencies as they claim to. For example, 
countries claiming to run a free float may be intervening heavily in the exchange rate spot market in 
order to avoid unwanted nominal volatility; in a de facto classification, such countries would have 
an intermediate/fixed regime and not a flexible one. Analogously, if the authorities devalue 
frequently in order to accommodate monetary policy in self-proclaimed hard pegs, such schemes 
should be classified as floats.  
                                                 
5 The list of countries used in this study is presented in Table A.1 (appendix). 
6 All data is available on-line at http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/query. 
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To avoid these problems, we use the de facto classification of Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005), which defines exchange regimes according to the behavior of the following 
three variables: 
  
• Exchange rate volatility (σe), measured as the average of the absolute monthly percentage 
changes in the nominal exchange rate relative to the relevant anchor currency (or basket of 
currencies, whenever the currency weights are disclosed) over the year. 
• Volatility of exchange rate changes (σ∆e), computed as the standard deviation of the monthly 
percentage changes in the exchange rate 
• Volatility of reserves (σr), measured as the average of the monthly changes in dollar- 
denominated international reserves relative to the dollar value of the monetary base in the 
previous month. 
 
 Flexible regimes are associated with mild interventions in the exchange rate spot market, so 
they should present high exchange rate volatility and high volatility of the changes in the exchange 
rate, joint with low volatility of international reserves. On the contrary, hard pegs are related to low 
levels of exchange rate volatility and low volatility of exchange rate changes, but a much higher 
volatility in reserves, given the need of local authorities to intervene in exchange rate markets to 
defend the nominal exchange rate at the established level. Finally, intermediate systems should 
experience moderate levels in all three variables, which would reflect movements in the nominal 
exchange rate alongside soft interventions. The last classification according to this methodology is  
that of “inconclusive”: countries showing very low variability along the three variables mentioned.  
 For fixed exchange regimes, the reference currency is the legal peg currency. For the rest of 
the countries, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger use the currency against which the country´s  
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exchange rate exhibit the lowest volatility.7 Countries that peg their currency to a basket are 
eliminated from the sample unless the central peg parity or the basket weights were known. This 
methodology allows to discriminate the intensity of the shocks to which the regime is subject. Table 
3 summarizes the criteria used to classify  the observations.   
 
Table 3.  De facto classification criteria 
 
 
 
 
6. Preliminary empirical analysis 
 
Before undertaking the formal analysis, it is useful to do a brief preliminary empirical inspection, 
whose results are summarized in table 4.  The average annual growth of per capita GDP in the 
whole sample of countries was 1.31% for the period  1974-2004.  Countries with flexible 
arrangements had an average annual growth of  2.24%, those with hard pegs of 1.51%, whereas  in 
countries with intermediate arrangements the average annual growth of per capita GDP was only 
1.24%.  
When we repeat the previous exercise for the volatility of per capita GDP growth (measured 
as the standard deviation of the growth rate), we obtain that the average annual volatility  for the 
154 countries in study was 4.37%. The lowest levels of output volatility were showed by countries  
                                                 
7 For this exercise the authors consider the US dollar, the French franc, the German marc, the British pound, 
the SDR, the ECU, and the Japanese yen. For some small countries, the currency of a large neighbour is also 
considered.  
Regime σe σ∆e σr
Flexible High High Low
Intermediate Medium Medium Medium
Fixed Low Low High
Inconclusive Low Low Low
Source:  Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005).
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with flexible regimes  (3.43%), followed by the economies with intermediate  arrangements 
(3.76%). The highest volatility is experienced by countries with hard pegs (4.77%). 
We can make a similar analysis using the median instead of the mean, because the former 
variable is less sensitive to extreme values (for instance, due to wars, conflicts or transition to 
market economies). The magnitude of the results changes, but not the qualitative conclusions 
According to  this analysis, flexible regimes experience the greatest median annual growth of per 
capita GDP (2.40%), followed by hard peg arrangements (1.75%), then by intermediate regimes 
(1.69%). In addition, flexible regimes show the lowest volatility of per capita GDP growth  
(2.59%), that is, 0.42% less than intermediate regimes and 1.01% less than hard pegs. 
It could be argued, for example, that the concentration of floating rate regimes took place in 
periods when output growth was high. In order to control for temporary effects, we compute the 
average growth rate of per capita GDP in deviations from the annual average for all countries. As in 
the previous case, the conclusions do not change. On average, flexible regimes experience the 
highest per capita GDP growth rate and the lowest levels of volatility. On the other hand, 
intermediate regimes underperform the other schemes in terms of growth, while hard pegs seem to 
induce the highest levels of growth volatility. 
 
Table 4. Preliminary Empirical Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
  Flexible Intermediate Fixed
∆Ypc Mean 2.24% 1.24% 1.51%
Median 2.40% 1.69% 1.75%
Controlling by temporary effects 0.64% -0.09% 0.12%
σYpc Mean 3.43% 3.76% 4.77%
 Median 2.59% 3.01% 3.60%
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This preliminary empirical analysis suggests, at first sight, that countries with floating rate 
systems experience the best macroeconomic performance during the period analyzed; this is 
reflected in both higher per capita GDP growth and lower growth volatility than the other 
arrangements. Floating rate countries show higher average growth than those with hard pegs, while 
intermediate arrangements always underperform the others. 
These results suggest a correlation between macroeconomic performance and the choice of 
exchange rate regime, but they do not guarantee causality. In order to verify the existence of 
causality it is necessary to make a formal econometric analysis. 
 
7. Econometric Estimates and Results 
 
In order to formally study the relationship between exchange regime choice and 
macroeconomic performance, we perform two set of regressions using a panel data set of 154 
countries for the period 1974-2004. In the first set of regressions the dependent variable is the 
annual growth rate of per capita GDP; in the second set the dependent variable is the volatility of 
per capita GDP growth rate (measured by its standard deviation). Econometric estimates are carried 
out using Zellner´s seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) approach.  
First, regressions are ran between per capita GDP growth as a dependent variable and 
several control variables, including dummies for the exchange rate regime. In doing so, we try to 
assess the relative importance (statistical significance and sign of the coefficients) of the different 
regime options, once controlling for specific factors common to most growth regressions. We 
specify our econometric model to include both state and control variables, which, according to 
theory, determine the level of output per capita in the long run  and subsequently the rates of growth 
of the economy. The first regression is of the following form: 
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                         ti
teIntermedia
ti
Flexible
tititi DDXY ,,3,2,10, εαααα ++++=
•
                                           (1) 
 
Yi,t is per capita GDP of country i in year t (a dot above a variable means percentage 
change). 0α  represents six regional dummies, which capture systematic growth differences between 
regions due to non-observable characteristics (statistically, this means that we allow for shifting 
intercept coefficients across regions). X is the set of explanatory variables. Following the standard 
literature, X  includes initial conditions and policy variables. Among the initial conditions we 
include: the log of average per capita GDP in the period 1970-1973 (to test conditional 
convergence) and the log of average years of schooling in the period 1970-1975 (as a proxy of the 
initial level of human capital). Control or policy variables include: openness (measured as exports 
plus imports over GDP); government consumption as a share of GDP (lagged one period to avoid 
possible endogeneity problems); gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP; terms of trade 
changes; and financial development, measured as the difference between quasi-money and money 
as a share of GDP.  εi,t is a random term. 
Additionally, we include in our baseline specification dummy variables for flexible and 
intermediate exchange rate regimes (
Flexible
tiD ,  and 
teIntermedia
tiD , ), according to the de-facto 
classification explained above . These variables take the value of one if the country is running a 
flexible or an intermediate regime, respectively, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable for hard 
pegs was excluded to avoid perfect mulitcolinearity. Table A.2 presents a summary of variable 
definitions and sources. 
Given that endogeneity may be an issue in our regressions, specifically between gross fixed 
capital formation, trade openness, and per capita GDP growth, we used as instruments the fitted 
values of regressions between: (a) the gross fixed capital formation, its lagged value and lagged 
GDP growth; (b) trade openness and its lagged value. With respect to financial development, we 
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take stock of the mounting evidence of recent years showing that financial development causes 
growth and, therefore, use it directly as an explanatory variable. 
We also perform regressions between the volatility of per capita GDP growth (measured by 
its standard deviation) and several control variables. The same exchange regime dummies were 
added in order to assess the relationship between growth volatility and regime choice. Additional 
variables included in the second regression are the volatility of gross capital formation and 
government consumption (both as a share of GDP), the volatility of terms of trade, financial 
development and six regional dummies. This regression is of the following form: 
                         ti
teIntermedia
ti
Flexible
tititi DDZY ,,3,2,10, µββββσ ++++=
•
                                       (2) 
Where, tiY ,
•
σ is the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth, 0β  represents the set of 
regional dummies, Z is the set of control variables,  
Flexible
tiD ,  and 
teIntermedia
tiD ,  are  dummies for the 
exchange rate regime and µi,t is a random term. 
 
7.1 Exchange rate regimes and  economic growth 
 
The results that reveal the relationship between per capita GDP growth and the choice of exchange 
rate regime are shown in Table 5 below:  
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Table 5.  Economic growth estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to our results, the investment rate, terms of trade growth, trade openness and 
financial development all have positive and statistically significant influences on per capita GDP 
growth. On the contrary, high levels of government expenditure seem to reduce economic growth. 
The negative coefficient associated to the initial level of per capita GDP is evidence in favor of the 
conditional convergence theory. These  results are standard  in the empirical growth literature. 
The most interesting results, however, are those related to the exchange regime choice. 
According to these estimates, flexible exchange rate regimes present the best macroeconomic 
performance in terms of per capita GDP growth. Controlling for other variables, countries running a 
free float experience average annual growth 0.32% higher than those countries managing hard pegs. 
The worst outcomes are related to intermediate regimes, which on average grow 0.53% less each 
year than fixed regimes, and 0.85% less than floats.  
Sample: 1974-2004
Obs: 1763
Average GDP per capita 1970-1973 -0.641*** 0.033
Average schoolling years 1970-1975 0.190*** 0.057
Government consumption -0.066*** 0.005
Gross capital formation 0.074*** 0.005
Openness 0.008*** 0.001
Term of trade growth 0.007*** 0.001
Financial development 0.009*** 0.002
Dummy flexible regime 0.320*** 0.060
Dummy intermediate regime -0.534*** 0.057
Regional dummy (Asia) 4.213*** 0.210
Regional dummy (Africa) 2.673*** 0.185
Regional dummy (Central America) 3.311*** 0.206
Regional dummy (Latin America) 3.771*** 0.215
Regional dummy (Europe) 3.435*** 0.288
Regional dummy (small islands) 3.074*** 0.244
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error
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Thus, there are important differences in economic outcomes stemming from different 
choices of exchange rate arrangements. These results are in contrast to the findings of Ghosh et al 
(1997), who do not find significant differences between the different exchange rate arrangements, 
and Hausmann et al (1999), who tend to favor  the hard pegs; they also question the skepticism of 
Calvo and Mishkin (2003) about this debate. At the same time, our results contradict those who 
recognize the undesirability of intermediate regimes but are indifferent to the option between hard 
pegs  and the floats, because the performance of the flexible arrangements is clearly superior to the 
those of hard pegs. 
At the same time, these results give empirical support to the bipolar vision also known as 
the “two-corner solution” and the preference for flexible regimes raised, among others, by Larraín 
and Velasco (2001, 2002). The preference by flexible arrangements also receives empirical support 
of Levy-Yeyati  and Sturzenegger (2003), Edwards and Levi-Yeyati (2003) and Larraín (2005). 
However, the results of our investigation differ from those of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
because these authors do not find statistically significant differences in the rates of growth of the 
intermediate regimes and hard pegs for non-industrial countries. Our research helps explain why 
intermediate exchange rate regimes have lost popularity in recent years while floating rates have 
gained so many converts.  
 What is the economics behind this result? Intermediate regimes tend to become 
unsustainable under massive capital flows reversals. In these episodes the collapse is not  
instantaneous, and the authorities defend the exchange rate through higher interest rates and loss of 
international reserves, which weakens economic activity and –many times-- the financial system. In 
the end, the exchange rate depreciates anyway, but a large part of the damage is already  done. 
Thus, for example, crawling pegs or narrow bands, included in our classification of intermediate 
arrangements, tend to be unsustainable.  
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Frankel, Schmukler and Servén (2000) provide an additional argument on why intermediate 
exchange regimes seem to be “vanishing” around the world. In their view, the limited verifiability 
(the ability to assess through public information which exchange regime the authority is actually 
running) of soft pegs plays a role against the credibility of the system. The idea behind this 
argument is that the credibility of an exchange regime choice is stronger if the public can check for 
themselves which regime exists through simple inspection of public information. Hence, the Central 
Bank’s credibility may not improve just because a certain exchange rate policy is announced. Thus, 
if the announced regime is a fixed peg, the market needs only to check that the stability of the 
exchange rate is greater than before to verify if the Central Bank is following the policy announced. 
If the arrangements is independently floating, the public can verify periodically if the monetary 
authority has taken part in the market observing the variation in the international reserves of the 
Central Bank. Nevertheless, intermediate regimes (exchange rate bands, crawling pegs, pegs to a 
basket of currencies, etc.) are not so easily verifiable as in the previous cases, reason why they are 
little transparent and, therefore, less credible. 
This line of argumentation may explain why intermediate exchange rate systems relate to 
poorer economic outcomes, but it does not allow us to make assessments on which one of the 
extremes is better. Nevertheless, in the presence of rigidities in the markets that cause inflexibilities 
in the adjustment of the prices, the movements of the nominal exchange rate allow the quick 
adjustment of the economy towards their new equilibrium once the existing relative prices have 
been obsolete due to real shocks, such as fall in the terms of trade.  On the other hand, developing 
countries are highly indebted, presents high concentration in the exportation and tend to be highly 
dependent of primary products exports, which does that the volatility of the real shocks to which 
they are exposed is particularly high. This, together with the fact that they have rigid labor markets 
(Heckman and Pages, 2001), makes necessary the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate  to adjust 
the relative prices when they have been obsolete. In the end, we know that the adjustment of prices 
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is going to happen independent of the exchange rate arrangements. The point is that flotation allows 
to accelerate the adjustment and thus to reduce the transition costs towards the new equilibrium.  
 
7.2  Exchange rate regimes and growth volatility 
 
Using an analogous methodology, we now investigate the relationship between the option of 
exchange rate regime and the volatility of per capita GDP growth.  
The results in Table 6 show that growth volatility is higher in countries with higher 
volatility of investment, government expenditure and terms of trade, and a less developed financial 
system. In contrast, higher levels of trade openness are related to lower volatility of  per capita GDP 
growth.  This point deserves to be emphasized, as it it suggests there is no trade-off: deepening 
trade integration into the world economy not only allows to grow more but also to reduce the 
growth volatility. 
 
Table 6. Growth volatility estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample: 1974-2004
Obs: 2101
Volatility of gross capital formation 0.391*** 0.003
Volatility of government comsumption 0.267*** 0.007
Volatility of terms of trade 0.022*** 0.001
Openness -0.008*** 0.000
Financial development -0.005*** 0.001
Dummy flexible regime -0.253*** 0.016
Dummy intermediate regime -0.106*** 0.015
Regional dummy (Asia) 2.370*** 0.027
Regional dummy (Africa) 2.676*** 0.027
Regional dummy (Central America) 1.983*** 0.028
Regional dummy (Latin America) 2.389*** 0.032
Regional dummy (Europe) 3.051*** 0.028
Regional dummy (small islands) 1.831*** 0.035
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error
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Our results show that growth volatility is also significantly affected by the choice of 
exchange rate regime. Nevertheless, now the worst performance is not associated to intermediate 
regimes, but to hard pegs. The best performance, as with growth, is with floats. Flexible rates show 
lower growth volatility than the other regimes: 0.25% less volatility than hard pegs and 0.14% less 
than intermediate arrangements.  
These results can be explained analogously to the previous case. In presence of rigid prices 
and wages (for example, as a result of labor markets rigidities), movements of the nominal 
exchange rate speed up the adjustment of relative prices, which reduces the volatility of output and 
employment. This option is lost when a country adopts a hard peg and, thus, the movements in 
output and employment are exacerbated. Hence, there is a negative relationship between economic 
growth volatility and the flexibility of the exchange rate regime. 
  
8. Conclusions  
 
This paper analyzed empirically the link between exchange rate regime choice and macroeconomic 
performance. Unlike previous works that either favor hard pegs or do not find significant 
differences in economic growth and its volatility across regimes, our evidence suggests that a strong 
relationship exists. Specifically, free floats seem to induce faster per capita GDP growth and lower 
levels growth volatility. Thus, there is no trade-off between growth and volatility, because the 
superiority of the flexible regimes occurs in both cases.  
 These results allows to understand the polarization arisen in the last decade in the election 
of exchange rate arrangements, where intermediate regimes have been increasingly abandoned, with 
countries migrating towards hard pegs or free floats. The superiority of floating rates over hard 
pegs, also displayed in our results, is consistent with the increasing penetration of floats in relation 
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to hard pegs, especially in developing economies. As a by-product, the prediction of some 
influential advocates that the world will converge to a single currency (or a hanful of currencies) is 
far from materializing.  The world will likely move to fewer currencies, mainly as a result of more 
European countries adopting the Euro, but the movement will probably happen at a very slow pace. 
The popularity of floats will likely remain in the foreseeable future. 
One first explanation to the results of our investigation is the unsustainability of 
intermediate regimes, in which the monetary authority declares to defend a certain parity or a band. 
Given negative external shocks to an economy, in a world where international capital markets are 
highly integrated, the central bank needs to increase interest rates and loose reserves in order to 
maintain the parity; the costs of this policy in terms of output, employment and investment, and of 
possible trouble in the financial sector, could be staggering. At the end, the exchange rate regime 
collapses but a great part of the damage has already  been done. 
 A flexible exchange rate regime provides a fast and efficient way to adjust relative prices 
under market rigidities and external shocks. This quality of free floats is of special relevance for 
developing countries, which tend to be heavily concentrated in commodity exports, are highly 
indebted and have rigid labor markets.  
   
  
  23
References 
 
Calvo, G. and Mishkin, S. (2003). ´The mirage of exchange rate regimes for emerging market 
countries´, National Bureau of Economic Research working paper No. 9808, Cambridge, MA: 
NBER, www.nber.org. 
Cooper, R. (1984), “A Monetary System for the Future”, Foreign Affairs, Fall.  
Edwards, S. and Levi-Yeyati, E. (2003).  ´Flexible exchange rates as shock absorbers´, National 
Bureau of Economic Research working paper No. 9867, Cambridge, MA: NBER, 
www.nber.org. 
International Monetary Fund (2002).  ´The evolution of the exchange rate regimes since 1990: 
evidence from de facto policies´, IMF working paper No. 02/155, Washington, DC: IMF, 
www.imf.org. 
International Monetary Fund (2004). ´Classification of exchange rate arrangements and monetary 
policy frameworks´, Washington, DC: IMF, www.imf.org. 
Frankel, J., Schmukler, S. and Servén, L. (2000). ´Verificability and the vanishing intermediate 
exchange rate regime´, National Bureau of Economic Research working paper No. 7901, 
Cambridge, MA: NBER, www.nber.org. 
Friedman, M. (1953). ´The case for flexible exchange rates´, in  Essays in Positive Economics,  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ghosh, A., Gulde, A., Ostry, J. and Wolf, H. (1997). ´¿Does the nominal exchange rate regime 
matter?´, National Bureau of Economic Research working paper No. 5874, Cambridge, MA: 
NBER, www.nber.org 
Hausmann, R. (1999), “Should there be five currencies or one hundred and five?”, Foreign 
Policy, Fall. 
  24
Hausmann, R.,  Gavin, M.,  Pagés-Serra, C. and  Stein, E. (1999). ´Financial turmoil and the choice 
of exchange rate regime´, IADB working paper N° 400, Washington, DC: Inter-American 
Development Bank, www.iadb.org.  
Heckman, J. and Pagés, C. (2000). ´The cost of job security regulation: evidence from Latin 
American labor markets´, National Bureau of Economic Research working paper No. 7773, 
Cambridge, MA: NBER, www.nber.org. 
Husain, A., Mody, A. and Rogoff, K. (2004). ´Exchange rate regime durability and 
performance in developing versus advanced economies´, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
52, pp 35-64. 
Krugman, P. (1979). ´A model of balance of payments crises´, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 11, pp. 311-25.  
Larraín, F. and J. Sachs (1999), “Why dollarization is more straitjacket than salvation?”, Foreign 
Policy, Fall. 
Larraín, F., and Velasco, A. (2001). ´Exchange rate policy in emerging market economies: the case 
for floating´, Essays  in International Economics, 224, Princeton University, December. 
Larraín, F., and Velasco, A. (2002). ´How should emerging economies float their currencies?´, The 
Economics of Transition, 10, pp. 365-92. 
Larraín, F. (2005). ´Flotar o dolarizar: ¿Qué nos dice la evidencia?´, El Trimestre Económico, vol. 
LXXII (1), january-march 2005, pp. 5-28. 
Levy-Yeyati, E., and Sturzenegger F. (2003). ´To float or to fix: evidence on the impact of 
exchange rate regimes´, American Economic Review, 93, pp.1173-93. 
Levy-Yeyati, E., and Sturzenegger, F.(2005). ´Classifying exchange rate regimes: deeds vs. words´, 
European Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Obsfeld, M. (1997). ´Destabilizing effects of exchange rate escape clauses´, Journal of 
International Economics, 43, pp. 61-77. 
  25
Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2002). ´The modern history of exchange rate: a reinterpretation´, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp. 1-48. 
Tornell, A., and Velasco, A. (2000).  ´Fixed versus flexible exchange rates: which  provides more 
fiscal discipline?´, Journal of Monetary Economics, 45, pp 399-436. 
World Bank (2004). World Development Indicators, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/query/. 
 
  26
Appendix 
 
Table A.1 List of countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Afghanistan Ecuador Lithuania Samoa
Albania Egypt, Arab Rep. Luxembourg Sao Tome and Principe
Algeria El Salvador Macedonia, FYR Saudi Arabia
Angola Equatorial Guinea Malawi Senegal
Antigua and Barbuda Estonia Malaysia Seychelles
Argentina Ethiopia Mali Sierra Leone
Armenia Fiji Malta Singapore
Aruba Gabon Marshall Islands Slovak Republic
Azerbaijan Gambia, The Mauritania Slovenia
Bahamas, The Georgia Mauritius Solomon Islands
Bangladesh Ghana Mexico Somalia
Belarus Grenada Micronesia, Fed. Sts. South Africa
Belize Guatemala Moldova Sri Lanka
Benin Guinea Mongolia Sudan
Bhutan Guinea-Bissau Morocco Suriname
Bolivia Guyana Mozambique Swaziland
Bosnia and Herzegovina Haiti Myanmar Syrian Arab Republic
Botswana Honduras 9amibia Tajikistan
Brazil Hong Kong, China 9epal Tanzania
Brunei Hungary 9etherlands Antilles Thailand
Bulgaria India 9icaragua Togo
Burkina Faso Indonesia 9iger Tonga
Cambodia Iran, Islamic Rep. 9igeria Trinidad and Tobago
Cameroon Iraq Oman Tunisia
Cape Verde Israel Pakistan Turkey
Central African Republic Jamaica Palau Turkmenistan
Colombia Jordan Panama Uganda
Comoros Kazakhstan Papua 9ew Guinea Ukraine
Costa Rica Kenya Paraguay United Arab Emirates
Cote d'Ivoire Kiribati Peru Uruguay
Croatia Korea, Rep. Philippines Vanuatu
Cyprus Kuwait Poland Venezuela, RB
Czech Republic Kyrgyz Republic Qatar Vietnam
Chad Lao PDR Romania Yemen, Rep.
Chile Latvia Russian Federation Congo, Dem. Rep.
China Lebanon Rwanda Zambia
Djibouti Lesotho St. Kitts and 9evis Zimbabwe
Dominica Liberia St. Lucia
Dominican Republic Libya St. Vincent and the Grenadines
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Table A.2 Variable definitions and sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description Source
Growth rate of GDP per cápita
Annual GDP growth rate minus
population growth rate
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Volatility of GDP per cápita growth rate
Standard deviation of GDP per capita
growth rate
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Average GDP per cápita 1970-1973 Logarithm of GDP per capita
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Average schoolling years 1970-1975 Logarithm of average schoolling years
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Government consumption Government consumption over GDP
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Gross capital formation Gross capital formation over GDP
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Openness
Sum of exports and imports of goods and
services as percentage of GDP
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Term of trade growth Annual growth of terms of trade
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Financial development
Annual difference between quasi-money
and money in percentage of GDP
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Volatility of gross capital formation
Standard deviation of gross capital
formation over GDP
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Volatility of  government consumption
Standard deviation of government
consumption over GDP
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Volatility of terms of trade Standard deviation of terms of trade
World Bank, World Development
Indicators 2005
Dummy flexible regime
Dummy variable taking value 1 for
countries with flexible exchange rate
regime, 0 otherwise
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005)
Dummy intermediate regime
Dummy variable taking value 1 for
countries with intermediate exchange rate
regime, 0 otherwise
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005)
Regional dummy (Asia)
Dummy variable taking value 1 for Asian
countries, 0 otherwise
Own elaboration
Regional dummy (Africa)
Dummy variable taking value 1 for
African countries , 0 otherwise
Own elaboration
Regional dummy (Central America)
Dummy variable taking value 1 for
Central American countries , 0 otherwise
Own elaboration
Regional dummy (Latin America)
Dummy variable taking value 1 for Latin
American countries, 0 otherwise
Own elaboration
Regional dummy (Europe)
Dummy variable taking value 1 for
European countries, 0 otherwise
Own elaboration
Regional dummy (small islands)
Dummy variable taking value 1 for small
islands, 0 otherwise
Own elaboration
